At CRYPTO 2018, Cramer et al. introduced a secret-sharing based protocol called SPDZ 2 k that allows for secure multiparty computation (MPC) in the dishonest majority setting over the ring of integers modulo 2 k , thus solving a long-standing open question in MPC about secure computation over rings in this setting. In this paper we study this problem in the information-theoretic scenario. More specifically, we ask the following question: Can we obtain information-theoretic MPC protocols that work over rings with comparable efficiency to corresponding protocols over fields? We answer this question in the affirmative by presenting an efficient protocol for robust Secure Multiparty Computation over Z/p k Z (for any prime p and positive integer k) that is perfectly secure against active adversaries corrupting a fraction of at most 1/3 players, and a robust protocol that is statistically secure against an active adversary corrupting a fraction of at most 1/2 players.
Introduction
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) is a technique that allows several parties to compute any functionality in secret inputs, while revealing nothing more than the output, even if an adversary corrupts t of the n parties.
Several flavors of MPC exist, depending on the desired security level and threat model considered. A protocol is perfectly secure if an adversary's view of the protocol can be simulated given only his inputs and outputs, and where the simulated view follows exactly the same distribution as the real view. It is statistically secure if the statistical distance between the views is negligible in a security parameter. We will say that a protocol is information-theoretically secure if it is either perfectly or statistically secure.
MPC has been a very active area of research since the 1980s, beginning with the seminal work of Yao on garbled circuits. Since then, many theoretical and practical results have been found by the community, extending the knowledge about what is possible, and increasing efficiency. However, almost all the progress has focused on arithmetic circuits over finite fields (even Boolean circuits are a special case of this). On the other hand, it is clearly also interesting to securely compute functions that are defined over other rings, such as Z/p k Z, the ring of integers modulo p k , where p is a prime and k is a positive integer. From a practical point of view, for instance, computing modulo 2 32 or 2 64 is close to what standard CPUs do. Closely matching the data format used by CPUs is an advantage since one expects that when programming secure computation one can reuse some of the techniques that CPUs use to run efficiently. Additionally, bitwise operations like comparison or bit decomposition are expressed more naturally modulo powers of 2, and are very fast when computed over these rings [1] .
This observation has been confirmed in practice [13] . For example, for replicated secret sharing, protocols over rings like Z/2 64 Z can provide up to 8× savings in runtime and memory usage with respect to the field counterpart for some specific applications like neural network evaluation, which are heavy in terms of comparisons [2] .
Thus, the natural question is: can we design protocols that work directly over Z/p k Z and have efficiency close to what we can obtain for fields?
This question was solved recently in the setting of dishonest majority (i.e. t ≤ n − 1), where cryptography is required to provide security, with the introduction of the SPDZ 2 k protocol [8] . This protocol computes with computational security circuits defined over the ring Z/2 k Z (in fact, 2 can be replaced by any prime). This is achieved mainly by the introduction of information-theoretic MACs that work over rings with zero divisors and non-invertible elements, like Z/p k Z. The efficiency is similar to the SPDZ and MASCOT protocols [12, 14] which are state-of-the-art for dishonest majority MPC over finite fields.
However, the question has remained open for the case of honest majority where we can hope to get better (information-theoretic) security. It is also expected that in this setting the computational efficiency improves due to the fact that the computation needed for information-theoretically secure protocols tends to be simpler, as it is independent of a computational security parameter.
Our Contributions
In this work we resolve the above open question. Our solution relies on several key ingredients, which may be interesting in their own right. We give an overview below.
The first ingredient is a new secret sharing scheme that allows us to do "Shamir-style" sharing of elements in Z/p k Z. We begin by noticing that Shamir secret sharing works over Z/p k Z as long as the secret is shared by at most p − 1 players. In order to accomodate more players whilst maintaining a constant p, our key solution is to move to a Galois ring R = (Z/p k Z[x])/(f (x)), where f (x) ∈ (Z/p k Z)[x] is a monic polynomial of degree d such that f (x) ∈ F p [x], its reduction modulo p, is irreducible. We get a secret-sharing scheme over R using polynomial interpolation that works with p d − 1 parties, so using the fact that R is a free module over Z/p k Z of rank d, we can embed Z/p k Z into the first coordinate of R and get an arithmetic secret-sharing scheme for Z/p k Z.
Since we need that p d is at least the number of players n, this incurs an overhead of log p (n). To secret-share an element in Z/p k Z in this manner, each player gets an element in R as his share, which can be represented as log(n) elements in Z/p k Z.
In terms of computational complexity, sharing an element requires O(n 2 polylog(n)) ring operations which is an improvement over the black-box approach from [10] . It is known that the FFT-algorithms for operations over degree-d finite field extensions, as well as operations on polynomials over such fields, carry over to degree-d Galois rings, preserving quasi-linear (in d) computational complexity when working over our ring R [6] .
For the remaining key ingredients, we distinguish between two models of MPC: perfectly secure MPC with t < n/3 assuming secure channels, and statistically secure MPC with t < n/2 in a setting where broadcast is given.
In the setting of perfectly secure MPC with t < n/3, we show that we can efficiently perform robust reconstruction in the presence of errors, we show that the hyperinvertible matrices needed in the protocol can be obtained over R can be obtained by lifting them from the residue field, and we show how to get MPC over Z/p k Z by efficient verification of the inputs, using techniques from [7] . We give the modifications needed to the protocol of [4] , to obtain MPC over Z/p k Z with the communication complexity for a circuit C of size |C| of O(n log(n)|C|) elements in Z/p k Z.
For the setting where t < n/2 and broadcast is given, we develop a way to reduce the soundness error when checking whether values are secret-shared correctly. 1 We also show a packing technique that allows us to reduce the overhead to obtain a total communication complexity O(|C|n 2 log n) ring elements, plus some term that does not depend on the size of the circuit. Finally, to get MPC over Z/p k Z rather than R, we show how to efficiently sample R-sharings of random elements of Z/p k Z with statistical security. These ideas allow us to adapt the protocol of Beerliova and Hirt [3] . We chose to adapt this protocol rather than the state-of-the-art of [5] , because it allows for a simpler exposition of our novel techniques.
The protocols we get for the two settings are both a log(n) factor away from their original results due to the extension of Z/p k Z to R. Follow-up work by some of the authors provides a way to amortize away this factor, by using so-called "reverse multiplication-friendly embeddings" from algebraic geometric codes over rings with asymptotically good parameters [11] .
Outline of the Document
In Sect. 2 we introduce the preliminaries for the rest of the work. This includes basic notation, Shamir secret-sharing over commutative rings, and the notion of Galois rings. Then, in Sect. 3 we present our protocol for perfectly secure MPC over Z/p k Z with a corruption threshold of t < n/3. Section 4 discusses our protocol for statistically secure MPC over Z/p k Z in the honest majority setting. Finally, in Sect. 5 we present some conclusions and future work.
Preliminaries

Notation
Z denotes the ring of integers. For m ∈ Z, mZ denotes the ideal {m · n | n ∈ Z}, and Z/mZ denotes the quotient ring, which we regard as the ring of integers modulo m. For a ring R, let R[X] denote the ring of polynomials in the variable X with coefficients in R. For an integer m ≥ 0, let R[X] ≤m ⊂ R[X] denote the set of polynomials in R[X] of degree at most m; it is an R-module. We denote by R * the multiplicative subgroup of invertible elements in R.
Polynomial Interpolation over Commutative Rings
In this section, we will construct secret-sharing schemes over an arbitrary commutative ring. It will be the building block for the MPC protocols presented in this article. We begin by recalling some notions on polynomial interpolation, and on how it follows from the Chinese Remainder Theorem for rings; we follow the approach of Part II of [9] .
Throughout this section, R will denote a commutative ring with multiplicative identity 1. Recall that an ideal of R is an additive subgroup I ⊆ R such that r · x ∈ I for any r ∈ R, x ∈ I, i.e., an R-submodule. For x ∈ R, (x) denotes the ideal generated by x, i.e., (x) := {r · x | r ∈ R}. Given two ideals I, I , their product is defined as the ideal II given by finite sums of products xy with x ∈ I, y ∈ I , and their sum I + I is defined as the ideal given by all elements of the from x + y, where x ∈ I, y ∈ I . Now we state the Chinese Reminder Theorem over rings. 
We now recall some notions and results on polynomials over rings.
Theorem 2. Let g(X), h(X) ∈ R[X]
be two polynomials, with h(X) monic (i.e., its leading coefficient is equal to 1). Then, there are two unique polynomials q(X), r(X) ∈ R[X] such that -g(X) = h(X)q(X) + r(X), and -deg r(X) < deg h(X). Corollary 1. We have the following:
is an isomorphism of R-modules.
The above properties lead to the following result:
We then have that the map
is an R-module isomorphism. Hence, for any x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ R, there exists a unique interpolating polynomial of degree at most m − 1 such that f (α i ) = x i for each i.
Notice that since α i − α j is invertible for every i = j, we have that the ideals (X − α i ) and (X − α j ) are co-maximal for every i = j; thus by Theorem 1 we have that the map
Finally, again by Corollary 1, we have that the map
The above theorem thus shows that polynomial interpolation extends from the field to the ring case, provided that the evaluation points are not only pairwise distinct, but that their pairwise differences are invertible. Definition 1. Let α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ R. We say that these points form an exceptional sequence if for each pair of integers 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n with i = j it holds that α i − α j ∈ R * . We define the Lenstra constant of R to be the maximum length of an exceptional sequence in R.
We the theory seen this far we can already define Shamir-secret sharing over an arbitrary ring R.
Construction 1 (Shamir-secret sharing over R).
Let R be a finite ring, and let α 0 , . . . , α n ∈ R be an exceptional sequence. Let t be any positive integer such that t ≤ n. We define the R-module of share vectors
To secret-share an element x ∈ R, pick a uniformly random share vector x ← {(x 0 , . . . , x n ) ∈ C | x 0 = x}, and set the i-th share to be f (α i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. If x is secret-shared with each player P i having a share x i , we denote the share vector x by [x] .
Note that the number of players the secret-sharing scheme admits is bounded by the Lenstra constant minus 1. Combining Construction 1 with Theorem 3 we have the following. Proposition 1. Construction 1 provides t-privacy and (t + 1)-reconstruction.
Galois Rings
We now restrict our attention to Galois rings, which are very well suited to our setting, since they contain Z/p k Z as a subring and have a relatively high Lenstra constant. For proofs of the assertions in this subsection, we refer the reader to [16] .
Definition 2. A Galois ring is a ring of the form
Proposition 2. Let R as in the above definition. It has the following properties:
1. R is a local ring, i.e. it has a unique maximal ideal (p) R. We have that R/(p) ∼ = F p d , where d denotes the degree of h. In particular, we have a homomorphism π : R → F p d that is "reduction modulo p". 2. The Lenstra constant of R is p d . 3. For any prime p, positive integer k, and positive integer d there exists a Galois ring as defined above, and any two of them with identical parameters p, k, d are isomorphic. We may therefore write R = GR(p k , d). 4. If e is any positive integer, then R is a subring ofR = GR(p k , d · e). There is Moreover, there is another way to uniquely represent the elements of R. We have R/(p) ∼ = F p d and there exists a non-zero element ξ ∈ R * of multiplicative order p d − 1. By defining the subset I = {0, 1, ξ, . . . , ξ p d −2 } ⊂ R, it turns out that any element a ∈ R can be uniquely written as a = k−1 i=0 a i · p i where a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ∈ I. Note that the homomorphism π : R → F p d that is reduction modulo p from Item 1 in Proposition 2 is defined by π(a) = a 0 .
This decomposition also allows us to define "division by powers of p". Indeed, notice that given an element a = a 0 + a 1 p + a 2 p 2 + · · · + a k−1 p k−1 ∈ R and a positive integer u, we have that p u divides a if and only if a i = 0 for all i < u. If this is the case, we then define a/p u := a u + a u+1 p + · · · + a k−1 p k−u−1 ; notice that a/p u ≡ a u (mod p). If u is maximal and a is non-zero in R, then a/p u ∈ R * .
Perfectly Secure MPC for t < n/over Galois Rings
We assume that the computation is performed by n players, connected by a complete network of secure and authenticated channels. Let p be a prime number and k a positive integer; t players are under the control of a malicious, computationally unbounded adversary, where t < n/3. The adversary can be adaptive and rushing.
We adapt the protocol of [4] , which uses three algebraic tools: the interpolation of a polynomial, hyper-invertible matrices and efficient error correction in Reed-Solomon codes. In the original protocol, these tools are defined over finite fields. In this section, we provide analogues of these tools over Galois rings. Note that the first tool, polynomial interpolation, is already given in Construction 1.
With these new tools, we obtain secure computation over any Galois ring R that has a Lenstra constant of at least n + 1. By taking the Galois ring to be large enough, we can accommodate any number of players. In Sect. 3.4, we show how to we obtain secure computation over Z/p k Z from computation over R. For passive security this is automatic, but for active security this requires verification of the inputs.
Hyper-Invertible Matrices
Hyper-invertible matrices are introduced in [4] to efficiently obtain secret-shared randomness in MPC protocols with active security. Here we summarize their definition and fundamental properties, generalized to hold over rings. Construction 2. Let n and k be positive integers, and let p be a prime number. Further, let R = GR(p k , d) with p d ≥ 2n, and let α 1 , . . . , α 2n be an exceptional sequence in R. Applying Theorem 3 twice, we get an R-module isomorphism from R n to R n , sending (f (α 1 ), . . . , f(α n )) → (f (α n+1 ), f(α n+2 ), . . . , f(α 2n )). It is represented by an n × n matrix over R which is hyper-invertible. The proof of this fact follows the lines of its analogous proof over fields, and we refer the reader to [4] for details.
Hyper-invertible matrices have the following key property. The proof from [4] carries over, given the properties that we have shown for R. Lemma 1. Let M ∈ R n×n be an n-by-n hyper-invertible matrix, and let I, J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be index sets such that |I| + |J| = n. Then, there exists a linear isomorphism ϕ = ϕ I,J : R n → R n such that for any x, y ∈ R n it holds that ϕ(x J , y I ) = (xJ , yĪ ), whereR andC denote the complements {1, . . . , n} \ R and {1, . . . , n} \ C, respectively.
Robust Reconstruction
Recall from Construction 1 we have an
We wish to have robust reconstruction: a party P that receives shares x i for i = 1, . . . , n, where x i = f (α i ) for "most" values of i, should be able to reconstruct the correct secret f (α 0 ) even some shares are corrupted, e.g., they contain arbitrary elements of R. This is also known as the decoding problem of linear codes. When R is a finite field, R-vector spaces of the form C as above are known as (generalized) Reed-Solomon codes. We want an algorithm that does the following. As input we give a vector (
positions. As output, the algorithm has to produce f .
We assume black-box access to a decoding algorithm for Reed-Solomon codes (i.e. for vector spaces of the form C as above when R is a finite field), such as the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [15] . We show how to obtain a decoding algorithm for C over a Galois ring R = GR(p k , d) that makes k calls to the algorithm over fields.
We fix an exceptional sequence α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ R. Recall from Remark 1 that any element a ∈ R can be uniquely written as
Since α 1 , . . . , α n have their pairwise differences invertible, this means they map to distinct elements modulo p. For each i = 1, . . . , n let β i = π(α i ) ∈ F p d where π : R → F p d is the reduction modulo p from Item 1 of Proposition 2. Notice that π gives this one-to-one correspondence between I and F p d . In particular, the inverse π −1 is a well-defined function onto I. 
Decoding Reed-Solomon Codes over a Galois Ring
-Let y ← x. For i = 0, . . . , k − 1 perform the following operations:
1. y ← π(y/p i ), applied element-wise. 2. Run the decoding algorithm the input y and let thefi(X) be the output
. . , n and y ← (x1 − t1, . . . , xn − tn). 4. If there exists j such that xj − tj is not divisible by p i+1 , we claim an error in index j and set ⊥ on the j-th component of y. Proof. Let us justify this decoding algorithm. We start with i = 0. Note that
is a vector in the corresponding Reed-Solomon code over
positions from c f , the decoding algorithm over F p d will recoverf 0 (X) and then f 0 (X). Now, assume that we have already recovered f 0 (X), . . . , f i (X). Let us fix x j , the j-th component of x. Assume that x j is not corrupted, i.e., x j = f (α j ). Then, we have
. . ,f i+1 (β N )) in the position that is not corrupted. It follows that π(y/p i ) differs in at most
positions from (f i+1 (β 1 ), . . . ,f i+1 (β N )). Running the decoding algorithm over F p d on π(y/p i ) will output the polynomial f i+1 (X). The desired result follows as we only invoke the decoding algorithm over the finite field k times.
MPC over R
Let d be the smallest positive integer with p d ≥ 2n, and write R = GR(p k , d). Let (α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α n ) and (β 1 , . . . , β 2n ) be exceptional sequences of R of respective lengths n + 1 and 2n.
We replace some of the components of [4] to extend this protocol over rings. We use the n-player Shamir-like secret-sharing scheme obtained in Construction 1, where α i is assigned to each player P i . Thus both the share and secret lie in R. Also, we use the hyper-invertible matrices from Construction 2, with evaluation points β 1 , . . . , β 2n ; and we recover secrets from n ≤ n shares with t corruptions, provided that t < n − 2t , using the procedure in Fig. 1 .
With these tools in place, the remainder of the protocol from [4] can be used to obtain MPC over R, as encapsulated in the following theorem. Theorem 5. There exists an efficient MPC protocol over the Galois Ring R = GR(p k , d) with p d ≥ 2n, for n parties, that is secure against the maximal number of active corruptions (n − 1)/3 , and that has an amortized communication complexity of O(n) ring elements per gate.
MPC over Z/p k Z
From Theorem 5, we get MPC over R = GR(p k , d) with p d ≥ 2n, but this does not give us MPC over Z/p k Z for an arbitrary number of players. We can embed inputs in Z/p k Z into R, but we do need to verify that the original inputs are actually in Z/p k Z.
Proving that a secret-shared value [a] is in Z/p k Z reduces to sampling a secret-shared random element [r] ← Z/p k Z, as follows: to check that a ∈ Z/p k Z we simply locally compute [a + r] and open the result. We have that a ∈ Z/p k Z if and only if a + r ∈ Z/p k Z. Also, since r is a uniformly random element in Z/p k Z, a + r does not reveal any information about a (if a is in fact in Z/p k Z).
We use an idea from [7] to generate these sharings of random elements in Z/p k Z. Since R is a free module over Z/p k Z of rank d, we can write down a basis of R. In fact, a power basis 1, ξ, . . . , ξ d−1 exists. After fixing ξ, an element b ∈ R can thus be uniquely written
Thus, this operation can be seen be represented as a d × d matrix M λ with entries in Z/p k Z such that for any b ∈ R it holds that φ(λb) = M λ φ(b). This is similar to how elements in a field extension can be seen as matrices over the base field. Now, let A be an n × n matrix with entries in R, for arbitrary n ≥ 1, and let (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n be a vector. Each entry x i can in turn be represented as a vector (
In Fig. 2 , we present a protocol for constructing sharings over R of random elements in Z/p k Z. The function of RandEl(Z/p k Z) is to amortize away the cost of generating sharings of random elements in Z/p k Z and meanwhile to verify if the shares correspond to a random element in Z/p k Z instead of R. Our protocol is similar to RandElSub(V ) in [7] . Using player elimination, we assume that there are currently n parties taking part in the computation (labeled P 1 , . . . , P n without loss of generality) and at most t of them are corrupted. Note that t < n − 2t . If a party is unhappy, player elimination ensures that we can find a pair of players that contains at least one corrupted player. Like Proposition 4 in [7] , we only need to communicate O(n) elements in R per sharing of a random element in Z/p k Z. [r T,d ] are correct sharings of uniformly random elements in Z/p k Z, and the adversary has no information about these values, other than the fact that they belong to Z/p k Z.
Proposition 3. If all honest players are happy after the execution of
With the help of Proposition 3 and our above analysis, we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 6. There exists an efficient n-party MPC protocol for circuits defined over Z/p k Z, that is secure against the maximal number of active corruptions (n − 1)/3 , and that has an amortized communication complexity of O(n log n) ring elements per gate.
Statistically Secure MPC for Honest Majority over Galois Rings
In this section we present a protocol for secure computation over the Galois ring R = GR(p k , d) that is statistically secure against active adversaries. The protocol tolerates a number of corrupted parties t < n/2, which is optimal in this setting. Our protocol is largely based on the dispute control protocol from [3] . However, some of their techniques explicitly use properties about fields, which do not apply to our setting directly. In this section we show that, due to some special properties of the Galois ring R (mostly the fact that R is local), most of these techniques actually apply to this setting as well, at the expense of having a higher failure probability than in the field case. More explicitly, when working over a field F it can be shown that the failure probability is roughly 1/|F|, but in our setting this probability is close to 1/p d , which is potentially far from 1/|R| = 1/p k·d . In particular, this implies that d must be as large as the security parameter κ.
However, if we have our computation over R = GR(p k , d) with p d ≥ n + 1, so that we have enough interpolation points for each player, we can avoid much of the overhead. We do this by moving to an extension Galois ringR = GR(p k , d ·d) ⊃ R (see Proposition 2) . For many subprotocols where the error depends on p d , we can packd values of R intoR (sinceR ∼ = Rd as R-modules), and keep the same amortized complexity. In particular, we do not get a total complexity that is linear in both the size of the circuit and the security parameter κ, which is what one would get if d were as large as κ.
To get computation over Z/p k Z where p ≤ n, we embed Z/p k Z → R, but we do need to verify that the inputs are actually in Z/p k Z, like we saw in Sect. 3.3. We will develop the machinery needed for this in Sect. 4.7.
Overview of Our Techniques
We begin by presenting a summary of the main novel techniques used to achieve the results in this section. The details of these, and their specific usage in the context of our protocol, are explained thoroughly in subsequent sections.
Error Checking. To guarantee correctness of the computation, we need a process that checks whether values are secret-shared correctly, with negligible error. Suppose we have secret-shared values [x 1 ], . . . , [x ] and we want to check whether the players have consistent shares, i.e. each reconstructing set of honest players jointly have shares that reconstruct to the same secret value. A trick commonly used over fields is to fix a random linear combination y = r 1 x 1 + · · · + r x , for publicly known uniformly random values r 1 , . . . , r , and to have the players broadcast the shares of y. They can then check whether their shares are consistent, e.g. for Shamir's secret-sharing scheme they check whether the shares are on a polynomial of degree of at most t.
This approach works over a finite field F since the inner product of any nonzero vector (an "error vector") with a uniformly random vector is zero with probability 1/|F|. Therefore any inconsistency in some value x i is very likely to give an inconsistency in y. In other rings, this does not necessarily apply, and the product of a non-zero value times a random value is not necessarily random: for example, in Z/2 k Z we have Pr[r · 2 k−1 = 0] = 1/2 for uniformly random r.
For the Galois ring R, it turns out the above procedure does work, but only with error probability p −d , i.e. it only scales in the degree of the Galois ring, not in its order p k·d . We illustrate this with the following protocol.
Consider the setting where we have a single dealer that secret-shares a single secret value [x] ∈ R and a single verifier that wants to check whether [x] is secret-shared correctly. To ensure privacy towards the verifier, the dealer also secret-shares a random value [u] ∈ R. The protocol runs as follows: This protocol is private because u is chosen uniformly random by the dealer. We shall now analyze the soundness error. It is useful to take a more general view, and let C ⊆ R n denote the set of vectors of consistent shares; recall C from Construction 1. More generally, let C be any free R-module, i.e. it has a basis. Note that the verifier accepts if y ∈ C, and the dealer cheats successfully if the verifier accepts and x / ∈ C. We analyze the soundness error using a fact about roots of polynomials over R:
Proof. Write f (X) = a 0 + a 1 X + · · · + a X . Let u be the highest power of p such that p u divides each coefficient a 0 , . . . , a of f . Then, f (X)/p u has at least one coefficient invertible, hence its reduction g := f (X)/p u modulo p is a nonzero polynomial of degree ≤ over the field R/(p) of order p d . Clearly, if f (x) = 0 then x := x mod (p) is a root of g. Since g has at most roots, g(x) = 0 with probability ≤ /p d for uniformly random x. Since reduction modulo (p) is a homomorphism, in particular it has pre-images of equal size, hence given that x is uniformly random in R, x is uniformly random in R/(p).
where r is chosen uniformly at random from R.
Proof. Let g : R n → R be an R-module homomorphism such that g(c) = 0 for all c ∈ C, and such that g(x) = 0. Such a homomorphism in particular exists because C is free, and it is therefore a direct summand of R n . If rx + u ∈ C, then 0 = g(rx + u) = rg(x) + g(u), so r is a root of the linear polynomial g(x)X + u, which by the previous lemma occurs with probability ≤ 1/p d .
Packing. To get a negligible correctness error for MPC over R, our solution is to move from R to an extension R ⊂R, whereR = GR(p k , d ·d) for an integer d > 1 with p d·d ≥ 2 κ . However, the efficiency is unfavorable since communication and computation is Ω(κn 2 ) per multiplication gate.
To improve efficiency, we observe thatR is a free R-module of rankd, i.e. R ∼ = Rd. Therefore, we can interpret an element ofR as a vector of elements of R of lengthd. This allows us to checkd elements of R in parallel, by checking one element ofR. InR our correctness check has error probability p −d·d ≤ 2 −κ , and thus by moving to the extension we can both achieve the desired soundness error while getting no amortized overhead.
Let g(Y ) be a monic polynomial over R of degreed which is irreducible when taken modulo p, and letR = R[Y ]/(g(Y )). Let w 1 , . . . , wd be a basis ofR over R as a module and consider the natural isomorphism of modules ψ : Rd →R given by ψ(
Finally, consider y ∈R with ψ(y 1 , . . . , yd) = y and assume that y is secretshared via a polynomial F ∈R[X] and that the exceptional sequence α 1 , . . . , α n of evaluation points is in R. This polynomial can be written uniquely as
. Moreover, we notice that for all r ∈ R it holds that F (r) = ψ(f 1 (r), . . . , fd(r)), so in particular the polynomial f i defines shares of y i , for i = 1, . . . ,d. Conversely, if we have shares of y 1 , . . . , yd using polynomials f 1 , . . . , fd over R, then we can define a share of ψ(y 1 , . . . , yd) overR which is given by the polynomial F = d i=1 f i · w i . We abuse notation and write ψ([y]R) = ([y 1 ] R , . . . , [y m ] R ) to denote the situation above.
We then have the following: To get a random sharing [s], a straightforward solution is to let each player P i sample a random element s i and secret-share it (over R). The players then compute [s] = n i=1 [s i ]. We can check the correctness of [s] by using the method of Sect. 4.1, where we check a batch of many different values at once. However, in this situation, we are only allowed to take S-linear combinations. In particular, for S = Z/p k Z, Lemma 3 only gives an error probability of 1/p.
To reduce the error probability, we do the following. Let C be the set of share vectors [s] = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) of secrets s ∈ S, with shares s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ R. Note that C is an S-module but not an R-module in general. Since R is a free module over S, we have R ∼ = S e where e = rank R. We may now take the extension of scalars of C to R via the following tensor product of S-modules:
In contrast to C, we have thatĈ is an R-module, and in fact an R-submodule of R n ⊗ S R ∼ = R n·e . A dealer will secret-share a vector of e random elements of S in parallel over R. Each player thus obtains a vector of shares (with each entry in R), which can be interpreted as one element of R ⊗ S R ∼ = R e . All of the players' shares together form a vector in R n·e , which is inĈ if indeed the e secret-shared elements are in S. We can now apply the methods from Sect. 4.1 to batch check these values with error probability 1/p d .
Computation over Fields
As a base for our protocol for statistically secure MPC in the honest majority setting, we choose the protocol from [3] . It maintains the invariant that every wire of the circuit is secret-shared using Shamir's secret-sharing scheme. Linear gates are given for free by the secret-sharing scheme, and multiplication gates are handled by means of some preprocessed data known as multiplication triples, which are generated themselves using a technique known as resharing. The protocol follows the traditional offline/online paradigm where the multiplication triples are generated during the so-called offline phase that is independent from the inputs, and these triples are subsequently used in the online phase to perform the actual secure computation.
With the secret-sharing scheme over rings from Sect. 2.2, adapting the basic resharing based protocol to the ring setting is straight-forward. Therefore, an efficient protocol for statistically secure computation with honest majority with abort and over rings can be easily developed at this point. However, in this work we aim for full security, and in order to provide robustness we need to adapt the tools introduced by the dispute control technique, and this becomes much more involved since these highly exploit the fact that the underlying structure is a field.
While we do not have the nice structural properties of fields, we are able to exploit properties of Galois rings to obtain sub-protocols with comparable efficiency to those over fields. In the rest of the section we will focus only on the algebraic aspects of dispute control that must be modified in order to adapt them to work over Galois rings. A second part of dispute control uses more "combinatorial" arguments which are independent of the underlying algebraic structure and therefore they apply directly to our setting. In these cases we refer the reader to the appropriate references.
Dispute Control
Dispute control is a technique used in [3] in order to provide guaranteed output delivery. Here the parties keep track of a publicly known dispute set Δ of unordered pairs {P i , P j } of parties that are in dispute. We write P i ↔ P j if {P i , P j } ∈ Δ, and P i ↔ P j otherwise. At a very high level, a new dispute P i ↔ P j is generated whenever P i thinks that P j has cheated, or vice versa, and the protocol will guarantee that whenever a new dispute is generated then at least one of the two parties involved is corrupt (i.e. an honest party will never go in dispute with another honest party).
We let Δ i denote the set of parties P j such that P i ↔ P j . Let X ⊆ P denote the set of parties P i that have |Δ i | > t, i.e. parties that have a dispute with more than t other parties. They are universally known as corrupt, because no honest party can have a dispute with more than t other parties.
At a very high level, the way in which dispute control is used in the protocol is the following. The computation is divided into segments such that at the end of each segment there is a consistency check. If the check fails, the parties run a dispute control protocol that results in a new pair of players that are not yet in dispute, such that one of them is guaranteed to be corrupt.
Once the dispute has been identified, the segment is re-run. There can be at most t(t + 1) disputes. By dividing the computation into n 2 segments of approximately equal length, the overhead of repeating failed segments is at most a factor of 2. In this work we will not focus on the details of dispute control and we only introduce it as we will need the notation. For the details of dispute control see [3] .
1D, 2D and 2D * Sharings
As before, let h(Y ) ∈ (Z/p k Z)[Y ] be a monic polynomial of degree d such that its reduction mod p is irreducible, and let R be the Galois ring (Z/p k Z)[Y ]/(h(Y )). We assume that d ≥ log p (1 + n), so that there is an exceptional sequence 0, α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ R.
Given r ∈ R, we write [r] R to denote the situation in which r is secret-shared using our secret-sharing scheme from Construction 1 over the ring R (if R is obvious we omit it, as we have done until now). Recall from Sect. 2.2 that this means that there is a polynomial f over R of degree at most t such that party P i has the share r i = f (α i ) for i = 1, . . . , n, and r = f (0). We shall call this a 1D-sharing of r, and refer to the shares r 1 , . . . , r n as level-one shares.
If each level-one share r i is itself 1D-shared as [r i ] R we say we have a 2Dsharing of r, and we denote this by [[r] ]. We refer to the entries of the share vector [r i ] as level-two shares.
Finally, we denote by r the situation in which r is 2D-shared and additionally the parties hold authentication tags on r. We will call this a 2D*-sharing of r, and it will be explained in detail in Sect. 4.5.
Sub-protocols for Secure Computation over Galois Rings
The overall protocol for secure computation follows the offline/online phase paradigm, which is typical from other secret-sharing based protocols, like these from [3] [4] [5] 8, 12, 14] . Essentially, the parties preprocess some material in the offline phase which is used in the online phase to perform the computation, after sharing the inputs. The building blocks to achieve this include procedures for sharing values, generating signatures, checking correctness of triples, and some others. In this section we describe the pieces required to build our protocol, and also the protocol itself. We prove their security and analyze their communication complexity.
For the rest of the section we let κ denote the statistical security parameter.
Dispute Control Broadcast. This protocol allows a set of senders to broadcast a set of values among all the parties such that, with overwhelming probability, all the parties receive the same value which is the one sent initially if the sender is honest. Also, this broadcast is "compatible" with the dispute control mechanism, in the sense that it detects cheaters and generates new disputes.
We remark that our model assumes a network with broadcast which may not provide dispute control by default. 2 Even though the protocol for dispute control broadcast of [3] uses fields, no arithmetic properties of the input values are used. We may therefore just serialize elements of R as bit strings, map them to a finite field of suitable size, and use their protocol verbatim.
Complexity Analysis. The protocol communicates O( nd + κn 2 ) = O( n log n + κn 2 ) bits and broadcasts O(nκ) bits. Here is the number of values in R being broadcasted, n is the number of players, and κ the security parameter. 3 Verifiable 1D-Sharings. This protocol allows one party P D to 1D-share some value x ∈ R with the guarantee that the shares of the honest parties are consistent with a degree-t polynomial over R. 4 Note that we make no guarantees 2 Assuming broadcast is necessary for t ≥ n/3 since it is known that unconditional broadcast is not possible in this settting. 3 Throughout this work we consider p and k as constants for the asymptotic complexity analysis. We also ignore the dispute control layer, as our complexity closely matches the one from [3] for the fault localization. 4 Notice that if there are exactly t + 1 honest parties then this is trivial since any set of t + 1 values is consistent with a degree-t polynomial. However, VSS1D is needed for the general case. beyond this; in particular, we do not guarantee robustness of shares. With the protocol, we can verify many different sharings at once, by opening a masked linear combination of the shares and checking correctness on the combination. For this protocol we will make use of the packing technique as detailed in Sect. 4.1. Recall we move to an extension ringR ⊃ R withR = GR (p k , d ·d) . We denote a 1D-sharing overR as [x]R, which corresponds to sharing a vector ofd elements of R via Lemma 4.
The protocol can be found in Fig. 3 .
VSS1D
A party PD will distribute values a (1) , . . . , a ( ) ∈ R among all parties.
-PD partitions a (1) , . . . , a ( ) ∈ R into L = /d vectors of lengthd: s (j) = (a (1,j) , . . . , a (d,j) ) ∈ Rd, for j = 1, . . . , L. -Let s (j) = ψ(s (j) ) ∈R for j = 1, . . . , L. If no verifier PV complained in the previous step, the output is defined to be [a (1) ]R, . . . , [a ( ) ]R = ψ −1 ([s (1) ]R), . . . , ψ −1 ([s (L) ]R). Fig. 3 succeeds then, with probability at least 1 − p −κ , each [a (m) ] R is correctly 1D-shared for m = 1, . . . , . If the protocol aborts then a new dispute is generated. Input-privacy is guaranteed during the whole protocol (even if it fails).
Proof. It is clear that the shared values remain secret since the random masks s (L+V ) prevent them from being revealed. Now, for soundness we consider the setting of an honest verifier P V checking the shares of the dealer. Let C denote theR-module of correct share vectors (see Construction 1) . The adversary successfully cheats if for some i we have [s (i) ] / ∈ C and the check passes, i.e.
Since the adversary knows which values they cheat on, we may take i = 1 without loss of generality. We can apply Lemma 3 and see that the probability of successfully cheating is at most 1/p dd ≤ 1/p κ .
Finally, since each [s (1) ]R, . . . , [s (L) ]R is correctly shared, it follows from Lemma 4 that the shares [a (1) , ] R . . . , [a ( ) ] R output by the protocol are correct. For the case in which a dispute is generated see Lemma 2 in [3] .
Complexity Analysis. The protocol communicates O n 2 κ + n log n κ bits and broadcasts O(n) bits.
Reconstruct 1D. Here we consider the setting in which a set of dealers P D ⊆ P \ X have 1D-shared some values [s (1, D) ], . . . , [s ( ,D) ], P D ∈ P D . The goal is to reconstruct the values s (m) = PD∈PD s (m,D) for m = 1, . . . , to a set of recipients P R ⊆ P \X . This is achieved by letting each player P i ∈ P compute its share of the sum s For the description of the protocol and its proof of security see Lemma 3 in Sect. 3.2 of [3] . The main observation is that their argument applies directly to our setting since it only relies on polynomial interpolation, which works for R in essentially the same way as it does for a field as long as the base points are chosen to form an exceptional sequence.
Complexity Analysis. The protocol communicates O( n 2 d) bits and broadcasts O(nd) bits, where d is the degree of the Galois ring R over Z/p k Z.
Generating Random
Challenges. An essential tool needed for statistically secure MPC is the generation of publicly known random elements. This is achieved by a protocol GenerateChallenges which operates as follows.
1. Each party P i ∈ P \ X samples some random values s (1,i) , . . . , s ( ,i) ∈ R and uses VSS1D to distribute correct shares of it. Since the additive group of R is abelian, if each s (m,i) is independent and there is at least one that is uniformly random, then s (m) is random. Now, the s (m,i) are independent from each other since they are secret-shared, so one player cannot choose its share conditioned on the other players' shares.
Complexity Analysis. The protocol communicates O(n 3 κ+ n 2 d) bits and broadcasts O(nd) bits where d is the degree of the Galois ring R over Z/p k Z.
Upgrading 1D-Sharings to 2D-Sharings. The goal of this protocol is to upgrade a 1D-sharing [a] of a ∈ R to a 2D-sharing [[a] ]. In fact, several values a (1) , . . . , a ( ) ∈ R will be upgraded in one go, and moreover, sums of 1D-shares instead of individual 1D-shares will be upgraded due to our use-case.
More precisely, let P D ⊆ P \ X be some subset of dealers. Each P D ∈ P D has a list of values a (1,D) , . . . , a ( ,D) ∈ R it has secret-shared. The goal of the Upgrade1Dto2D sub-protocol is to let each party P i distribute shares of its share a (m) i of a (m) = PD∈PD a (m,D) for m = 1, . . . , . At the end of the protocol it is guaranteed that all shares (both, the shares of each a (m) and the shares of their shares) are correct.
Upgrade1Dto2D
Let a (1,D) , . . . , a ( ,D) ∈ R such that each a (m,D) has been 1D-shared by PD ∈ PD. ). 2. For every Pi with Pi ↔ PV , PV checks that (si1, . . . , sin) lie in a polynomial overR of degree at most t. Then broadcasts accept or reject depending on the case. 3. If PV accepted in the previous step, then interpolate s1, . . . , sn and check whether or not these lie in a polynomial of degree at most t. Fault Localization: See protocol Upgrade1Dto2D in Section 3.4 of [3] .
If no verifier PV complained in the previous step, the output is defined to be [[a (1) Complexity Analysis. The protocol communicates O(n 3 κ + n 2 ) bits and broadcasts O(nκ) bits.
Information-Checking Signatures with Dispute
Control. The goal of information-checking signatures, or IC signatures for short, is to provide a way for one party P R to prove to another party P V that it received some specific shares from some other party P S . This will be used in the online phase to detect cheaters when revealed shares happen to be inconsistent. The idea is that whenever a player sends his share, he is "committed" to it by means of the authentication tags and therefore, if he sends an incorrect share, this can be detected by checking the tags.
For the IC signatures in this work we follow a similar approach to [3] , which at a very high level consists of finding a polynomial f that interpolates a set of messages as well as the point (0, y) for a randomly chosen y. The value y will be referred to as the authentication tag. The authentication key will be a random poiont (u, f (u)) on this polynomial where u is not an evaluation point corresponding to any of the messages. To check correctness, the key is used to interpolate the polynomial and then it is checked that its evaluation at zero matches the presented tag. Intuitively, if any message is modified then the polynomial will be different, and the only way in which an attacker can make the check pass is by presenting the right tag, which is equivalent to guessing point used as authentication key. If there are enough points to choose from, this happens only with low probability.
In more detail, the protocol IC-Distr allows a sender P S to send values m 1 , . . . , m ∈ R to a receiver P R along with authentication tags, and to send an authentication key to a verifier P V . At a later point the protocol IC-Reveal can be called to verify correctness of these tags. In this protocol, party P R sends the messages and their tags to P V , who can then verify their correctness using its authentication key. Theorem 7 (Lemma 6 from [3] ). If IC-Distr succeeds and P V , P R are honest, then with overwhelming probability P V accepts the message m in IC-Reveal (completeness). If IC-Distr fails, then the localized pair in dispute contains at least one corrupted player. If P S and P V are honest, then with overwhelming probability, P V rejects any fake message m = m in IC-Reveal (correctness). If P S and P R are honest, then P V obtains no information about m in IC-Distr (even if it fails) (privacy).
IC-Distr
A sender PS has messages m (1) , . . . , m ( ) ∈ R.
-Letd be such that d ·d ≥ κ. let L = /d, and assume thatd is large enough so 1,j) , . . . , m (d,j) ) ∈ Rd, for j = 1, . . . , L. -Let s (j) = ψ(s (j) ) ∈R for j = 1, . . . , L. (1) ), . . . , (βL, s (L) ), and computes vi = fi(ui). 3. PS sends the messages m (1) , . . . , m ( ) to PR, along with the authentication tags y1, . . . , y k . It also sends the authentication keys (u1, v1), . . . , (uκ, vκ) to PV . Fault Detection: PV reveals a random half of the keys to PR. Then PR checks the validity of these keys, who then broadcast accept or reject depending on the case. If the check passes then the remaining, unrevealed half of the keys is kept as the actual keys. Fault Localization: See Section 3.5 of [3] .
Fig. 5. Protocol for Distributing IC Signatures
IC-Reveal
A receiver PR has messages m (1) , . . . , m ( ) ∈ R and κ = κ/2 authentication tags y1, . . . , y κ ∈R. A verifier PV has κ authentication keys (u1, v1), . . . , (u κ , v κ ) corresponding to these messages.
-PR partitions m (1) , . . . , m ( ) ∈ R into L = /d vectors of lengthd: s (j) = (m (1,j) , . . . , m (d,j) ) ∈ Rd, for j = 1, . . . , L. -Let s (j) = ψ(s (j) ) ∈R for j = 1, . . . , L.
1. PR sends the messages and the authentication tags to PV 2. PV checks the validity of the tags using its authentication keys by checking that, for at least one i, the points (0, yi), (β1, s (1) ), . . . , (βL, s (L) ), (ui, vi) lie on a polynomial of degree at most L overR. Proof. Regarding completeness, notice that if the randomly chosen κ/2 tags are correct, then it holds that at least one of the remaining authentication tags is valid with probability at least 1 − κ/2 κ . For correctness, consider the scenario of an honest P V and a corrupt P R . Suppose that P R manages to make the check pass whilst presenting a different set of messages. Let f i be the polynomial of degree at most L overR interpolating (β 1 , s (1) ), . . . , (β L , s (L) ), (u i , v i ), then P R must have sent a tag y i that is equal to one of the elements in {f 1 (0), . . . , f κ (0)}. This can be done only if P R guesses at least one of the authentication keys (u i , v i ). Recall thatR has a Lenstra constant of at least p κ , so there are at least p κ − L − 1 possibilities for each u i . This means that the probability of guessing at least one u i is at most κ/(p κ − L − 1).
For the proof of the other properties see the proof of Lemma 6 in [3] .
Upgrading 2D-Sharings to 2D*-Sharings. Recall that in Sect. 4.4 we mentioned the concept of 2D*-shares, but we did not explicitly define it since we did not have the concept of IC signatures. We begin by defining what a 2D*-share is. Given a ∈ R, we say that a is 2D*-shared, written as a , if it holds that [[a]] and also, for every set of three players P R , P S , P V such that P R ↔ P S , P S ↔ P V and P R ↔ P V it holds that P R has authentication tags of the level-two share of P S 's share, and P V has the corresponding authentication keys. Protocol Upgrade2Dto2D* takes as input some 2D-shared values s (1) , . . . , s ( ) ∈ R, and upgrades them to 2D*-shares. The protocol works by calling IC-Distr for every set of three players P R , P S , P V such that P R ↔ P S , P S ↔ P V and P R ↔ P V , where the message m are the shares s For the security of the SacrificeTriple protocol we need to argue about the number of roots of a polynomial over a ring. In general, not much can be said since over a ring with zero divisors a polynomial can have many more roots than its degree. However, we have the following lemma, which bounds the number of roots that constitute an exceptional sequence. 
= 0 for some m, say m = 1. Now, suppose the protocol succeeds, then z (k) = 0. However, we see that this value is equal to 5
Now, since δ
(1) k = 0, it follows from Lemma 2 that rδ
is non-zero with probability at least 1 − p −κ (over the choice of r).
Applying Lemma 5 we see that conditioned on rδ
k ) = 0 holds with probability at most ( − 1)/p κ . Furthermore, using the same lemma we see that the probability that rδ
= 0 is at most 1/p κ . Therefore, putting these together we obtain that the adversary can only successfully cheat with probability at most /p κ .
Regarding privacy, we observe that the value r · a ∈R. Since this element is uniformly random for an honest P k , and given thatR is an additive group, we conclude that the private value a (m) k of P k remains hidden. For the arguments related to dispute control see Lemma 8 in [3] .
Complexity Analysis. Assuming that n log(n) ≤ κ 2 , the protocol transmits O(n 3 κ + n 2 κ ) bits, and broadcasts O(nκ) bits.
Final Protocol
Offline Phase. In the offline phase the parties generate a number M of multiplication triples ( a , b , c ) , where c = a · b and a, b are random. This phase is totally independent of the circuit to be computed (parties only need to make sure to generate as many triples as multiplication gates in the circuit), and therefore it can be executed at a totally different time than the evaluation of the circuit itself, thus the name "offline".
To compute these sharings, a technique known as re-sharing is used to obtain [a · b] from [a] and [b] . This works by letting the parties locally compute degree 2t−sharings of a · b by taking the local product of their shares on a and b. 5 We use the equalityã Then these shares are distributed and an appropriate linear combination is taken to obtain [a · b].
Assume for simplicity that n 2 divides M . To produce the M triples, the parties produce n 2 batches of L = M/n 2 triples each. To generate the L triples of each batch (or segment), the parties run the protocol from Fig. 8 . Notice that each segment may fail due to the dispute control, in which case a new dispute is identified and the segment must be repeated. Since there are most n 2 different disputes that can occur, there may be up to n 2 repetitions of segments overall, and since there are at most n 2 segments we see that there are at most 2n 2 segment executions. Proposition 8. The preprocessing protocol generates correctly 2D*-shared multiplication triples with overwhelming probability.
Proof. The proof follows from the properties of Upgrade1Dto2D, VSS1D and Upgrade2Dto2D*. See Lemma 10 in [3] for the details.
Complexity Analysis. Suppose that there are M triples to be processed. The preprocessing phase communicates O(Mn 2 log n + κ 2 n 5 ) bits and broadcasts O(n 3 κ) bits.
Preprocessing Protocol
Since this is the first protocol to be executed, initially the dispute set and the set of identified corrupt parties are Δ, X = {}. The following is executed for each segment, and each time a new dispute pair Pi ↔ Pj is identified, it is added to Δ and the segment is repeated. Online Phase. In the online phase is where the parties actually compute the circuit securely, using the triples that were preprocessed in the offline phase. We present here the online phase without the dispute control layer, which takes care of executing only certain amount of steps within a segment and checking correctness within that segment, repeating it if something was found to be inconsistent. We refer the reader to [3] for the details of how this is done.
This phase starts by the parties sharing their inputs. This is done by letting P i , for each i, share its input s (i) ∈ R to the other parties. For this P i begins by 1D-sharing s (i) and then the parties invoke the procedures Upgrade1Dto2D and Upgrade2Dto2D* to obtain 2D*-sharings of s (i) . Then the parties process the gates in topological order. For the addition gates, all the 2D-shares of the inputs are simply added locally, thus requiring no interaction. However, when two shared values [ As we mentioned at the beginning of the section, the details about how to handle consistency are exactly the same as discussed in [3] , so we omit some of the details of such procedure. See Sect. 6 in the aforementioned reference to see how this is done precisely. Something to point out is that consistency is eventually checked by means of the IC signatures from Sect. 4.5. This tool is used in dispute control so that some party P S can prove to some verifier P V that certain values were indeed sent by some other party P R .
Complexity Analysis. The input phase communicates O(c I n 2 log n + κn 5 ) bits where c I is the number of input gates, and broadcasts O(κn 3 ) bits. The computation phase communicates O(|C|n 2 log n + n 4 κ 2 ) bits where |C| is the size of the circuit, and broadcasts O(n 3 κ) bits.
Computation over Z/p k Z
Summing up, we have seen so far how to perform unconditional secure computation over the Galois ring R = (Z/p k Z[Y ])/(h(Y )). However, we wish to obtain unconditional secure computation over Z/p k Z itself. We can embed Z/p k Z into R in the natural way, and as seen in Sect. 3.4 this works for passive adversaries, but if an active adversary manages to share values that are in R \ Z/p k Z, correctness and security could be broken. As discussed in Sect. 3.4 and Sect. 4.1 this reduces to securely sampling an R-sharing of a random element [s] where s ← Z/p k Z.
Here we present a protocol RandElStat(S) in Fig. 9 for sampling this element [s] ∈ S efficiently. Here S ⊆ R denotes an arbitrary subring; for our use case S = Z/p k Z. We have made the protocol to be explicit and removed any mention of tensor products, but the intuition for this was given already in Sect. 4.1. The protocol succeeds with overwhelming probability.
is an inherent price to pay for working over an algebraic structure with less nice properties than a field, and our current approach to information-theoretic MPC over Z/p k Z seems to support this claim, at least in the setting of a single circuit execution.
We consider as future work improving the complexity of the protocols presented here (specially the one from Sect. 4 for honest majority) by adapting more efficient protocols over fields like [5] , whose complexity is almost-linear in the number of parties.
